

A graphic consisting of three concentric circles: a dark green inner circle, a light green middle circle, and a white outer circle. To the right of the circles, there are several short, thick, green dashed lines arranged in a curved pattern.

Opal

Tackling Serious Organised
Acquisitive Crime

AUGUST 2026

SUPPLY CHAIN CRIME

To maintain the secure handling of the document, the handling conditions must be read and complied with as part of your responsibilities in receiving this document. This document is marked as **OFFICIAL**. Dissemination is to policing contacts and nominated personnel (senior leadership/management, loss prevention, crime intelligence) associated with the relevant sectors to assist with security and contingency planning. Do not print without permission.

Opal/2026/0180

TRENDS FOR AWARENESS



STOLEN PROPERTY RE-SALE

Opal have been made aware of an MO whereby offenders are involved in the **movement and sale of large-scale stolen property** from HGV theft, back to the **victim company**. The offenders may present themselves as legitimate suppliers, exploiting the victims desire to recover stock quickly and minimise financial losses. This tactic enables criminal groups to profit from the theft whilst reducing the risks associated with storing, transporting or openly reselling identifiable stolen goods. Companies should be **cautious of unsolicited approaches** offering the return or sale of recently stolen stock and should report any such activity to Police and Opal.



TRACKER SWAPPING

Tracker Swapping is a highly co-ordinated criminal tactic where OCGs locate, remove, or electronically manipulate the HGV GPS tracking system. The **tracker is transferred to a decoy vehicle to simulate the HGV on its planned route**, while the genuine cargo is being diverted. This creates a false impression within fleet management and telematic systems that the legitimate vehicle remains in transit and operating normally, and the delay period provides an **extended window for offenders to transport the cargo to an alternative location**. Possible target hardening advice includes **alternating where the trackers are located within the HGV**, housing the tracker in a more **secure unit / locker** as a deterrent, and considering the use of **technology-based systems to protect / alert / defend** against such attacks.



FRONT PLATE REMOVAL

Offending vehicles **travel in convoy** with the HGV and **intentionally slow down surrounding traffic** on the motorway network, or block roads to detour the route of the target HGV to commit supply chain offences. The offending group use **cloned** vehicles, including a **DAF LF 7.5 tonne rigid box van, long wheel-based transit vans** and a **further car** to facilitate the offences. The **DAF** is either used to **block** the route of the HGV by positioning itself in front of the target HGV, or to slow down surrounding traffic. The **car** is used as a **second blocker vehicle**, positioned behind the target HGV. The group will then use the **transit style vans** to **escape** post offence with the stolen commodity.

Suspect vehicles in Op GAZELLE have **adapted their MO** and are now **not using front plates** on their mission vehicles **whilst travelling** to avoid detection via ANPR analysis. Opal urge policing and industry partners to remain vigilant to **long wheel-based transit vans** and **older style DAF LF 7.5 rigid box vans not displaying front VRMs**.



Image of distinctive DAF van used in many GAZELLE offences.

Is this something your force has noticed recently?
Have you identified any further emerging MOs?

EVENT OF NOTE

The new iPhone 18 is due to launch September 26.

It is highly likely that OCGs will target the Supply Chain for this product.

Police and Industry Partners are reminded to remain vigilant and report suspicious behaviour and incidents to the Police and Opal.

CRAVED MODEL

The CRAVED model is underpinned by **Rational Choice Theory** and the concept that offenders make calculated decisions based on **perceived risk and reward**.

If an item is easy to steal and valuable enough to justify the risk, it becomes a target. The model breaks down theft patterns into **six key factors** and aims to understand what makes an item attractive to offenders.

CONCEALABLE

- Items that are small or easy to hide, reducing the risk of detection

REMOVABLE

- Products that can be easily taken, i.e. insecure or lacking suitable security procedures

AVAILABLE

- Items that are widely accessible, displayed openly or left unguarded

VALUABLE

- High value or high demand items

ENJOYABLE

- Desirable products that provide personal satisfaction or utility

DISPOSABLE

- Items that can be easily re-sold or exchanged

EXAMPLES

High-value electrical goods (mobile phones, laptops, consoles etc), tobacco, alcohol, designer clothing/footwear, jewellery, fuel, cosmetics and pharmaceuticals.

THEFT PREVENTION STRATEGIES REDUCE RISK

CONCEALABLE

- Strengthening inventory processes, tamper-evident packaging

REMOVABLE

- Increased warehouse, vehicle and trailer security, robust loading/unloading procedures, access controls

AVAILABLE

- Parking in secure locations, limiting access to information on shipment contents, minimising periods of goods being unattended

VALUABLE

- Enhanced protection to high value commodities, risk-based route planning

ENJOYABLE

- Increased security around high-demand items such as high-profile tech releases


DISPOSABLE

- Make products traceable to disrupt resale markets

PREVENT-FUEL THEFTS


NaVCIS

OVERALL FUEL THEFTS ESTIMATED LOSS (£)




**The value of loss are NaVCIS estimates only and should not be taken as a true figure*

OVERALL FUEL THEFTS (VOLUME)



All bulk theft offences are occurring **overnight** whereby **fencelines are breached, locks are removed from storage tanks, and holes are drilled into the storage tanks to remove the fuel.** Sophisticated set ups have been left by suspects, which involve **pumps, batteries** and occasionally **vast lengths of pipes that lead away from the location to waiting vehicles.**

Bulk Fuel Thefts



Data source: NaVCIS Quarter

This data has been obtained from Police Forces and Hauliers.

Top 4 impacted Regions – Bulk Fuel Thefts (Thefts from bulk storage tanks and yards at distribution centres)

28 West Midlands

22 South West

18 East

12 Yorkshire and Humberside

How can businesses Prepare, Prevent and Protect themselves?

Daily physical security checks of the fenceline and fuel storage tanks for signs of preparation / theft

CCTV focussed on fuel storage tanks. Daily checks of overnight footage for any suspicious activity

Motion activated lighting covering the storage fuel tanks area

Defensive reinforcement / screening of the area around the fuel storage tanks to deter and delay – shrubbery, fencing / walls, bollards, strategically parking vehicles overnight to reduce / restrict access to the storage tanks

Install robust locks and anti-siphoning devices

Fit an alarm with a real time alert. Remote electronic fuel gauges can set off an audible alarm as soon as the level starts to drop

Remote locations: consider installing Perimeter Intrusion Detection (PID) devices. These are remotely monitored 24/7 and can contact Police as soon as suspicious activity is detected.

Any information in relation to load fraud should also be submitted to
freight@navcis.police.uk

OFFICIAL

OP TUPAYA

Series of keg burglaries

SUMMARY

Opal is investigating a series of linked offences impacting the **Avon & Somerset, Cambridgeshire, Hampshire & Isle of Wight** and **Sussex** police force areas.

Between October 2025 and June 2026, a total of **5 linked offences** were identified by Keg Watch LTD*. Offenders utilise a **Mercedes Sprinter van** to remove a large quantity of empty kegs from a brewery or unit. The goods are believed to be exported to Eastern Europe.

Opal has **identified 1 further crime** in the series as well as **3 key suspects, with 9 further suspects of interest**. We are developing intelligence around the OCG through open-source methods, financial enquiries, communications data analysis and international enquiries. Opal is sharing intelligence with the relevant police forces and supporting enforcement opportunities.

The total actual financial loss recorded to date for this crime series is **£45,000**.

ACTIONS / INTELLIGENCE GAPS:

There is a realistic possibility that this type of offending is impacting other force areas. If you have experienced any offences fitting this MO and you are not currently working with Opal, **please contact us and provide any incident data and intelligence to opalscc@opal.police.uk**


IMPACT

6

Offences

4

Forces impacted



This map highlights the forces impacted by Op TUPAYA offending

£45,000

Total loss

*Keg Watch have granted permission to be named

OP NARWHAL

Theft of Air Conditioning Units

SUMMARY

Opal is assisting with an OCG involved in the movement and sale of **large-scale stolen property** impacting the **Leicestershire** and **West Yorkshire Police Force** areas.

Offenders targeted a HGV and gained access through the side of the trailer whilst parked, **cutting the curtain** and removing the commodity, stealing approximately **60 air conditioning units**. Following the theft, the companies CEO was **approached by a third party** offering to sell air conditioning units to **replace the stolen stock**. Subsequent enquiries identified these units were in fact the stolen items taken from the HGV.

Intelligence suggests that members of the offending group have **previous links to freight crime** and the organisation of selling large quantities of stolen goods.

Opal continue to develop intelligence surrounding this via communications data analysis, open-source methods, and journey analysis.

ACTIONS / INTELLIGENCE GAPS:

There is a realistic possibility that this type of offending is impacting other force areas.

If you have experienced any offences fitting this MO and you are not currently working with Opal, **please contact Opal and provide any incident data and intelligence to** opalscc@opal.police.uk


IMPACT

2

Offence

2

Forces impacted



This map highlights the forces impacted by Op NARWHAL offending

£42,000

Total loss

UPCOMING WEBINARS



We are pleased **to invite you to attend a second series of online presentations** taking place in September. As with our previous webinars, these sessions will provide an opportunity to **update you on our progress, share emerging insights and best practice**, and strengthen our engagement with industry partners.

These webinars will also provide a forum for you to share your experiences and perspectives directly with Opal, helping us to better understand the **challenges currently affecting the supply chain crime landscape**. We are committed to ensuring these sessions are informative, practical, and directly relevant to all attendees, and we look forward to continuing this important **collaboration** with you.

TOPIC RECAP

Introduction to the SCC Team	Defining Supply Chain Crime
Crimes in scope – and those that are not	Tasking acceptance requirements
Case studies from our early activity	Who can submit taskings to the SCC desk
How SCC desk staff can support you	How to submit a tasking
Core functions and responsibilities of the SCC desk	

TO BOOK CLICK HYPERLINK OR SCAN QR CODE


[Wednesday 9th
September 10:00](#)



[Tuesday 22nd
September 13:30](#)



[Thursday 24th
September 10:00](#)



GOOD NEWS

OP ECHOBERRY

6 arrests



Offenders target parked HGVs, using knives to **cut the curtains** out of view of any nearby CCTV. Access is gained through the side of the trailer.

Opal researched, reviewed and attributed 60 entities and provided significant **analytical support** to assist in the investigation including pattern analysis, lifestyle analysis, mapping and data visualisation

This arrest led to the **identification of further offences** and linked offenders; Opal assisted in developing this into the next arrest phase.

Joint working between Opal, West Yorkshire Police and YHROCU Intelligence Unit led to the **arrest of 5 more** members of the OCG




Colleagues in West Yorkshire Police **made Opal aware of a series of linked curtain slashing freight offences.**

Losses reached over **£1.5 million**, with profits being **reinvested into the drugs market** by the OCG

Through communications data analysis, Opal highlighted links to a **wider criminal network**, leading to the **arrest** of the head of the OCG.

Due to the **strong working relationships** formed between Opal and West Yorkshire Police, we are now working together again to disrupt another OCG committing freight crime in the area.



BBC News Article 18 Aug 26

(<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/crrv4vypqzro>)

OFFICIAL

£1.5M+
loss to theft

4
forces

15
offences

7
offenders

TASKING



Fill out the [Opal Tasking Form](#) with the details of your referral. **Our staff can help you** with this process to ensure all important information is captured.



Taskings will be assessed against **threat, harm and risk** and considered against the SCC team **capacity and acceptance criteria**.



Submissions required by 1st of the month



If your tasking is accepted, you will be assigned a member of the team as a **SPOC** who will complete a terms of reference with you, provide operational updates and keep you informed of progress.

CRITERIA

Cross border



OCG / high harm individuals



High impact



Organisation



Active offenders



Investigative opportunities



Crime reference numbers

